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I. INTRODUCTION
Michael sat silently as he waited for his name to be called. This was
not his first time appearing before a judge. Michael had been arrested
multiple times before for getting into arguments with and hitting his wife.1
The last time he was in court, he was charged with fifth-degree misdemeanor
assault and the judge issued a criminal No Contact Order stating he could not
have any contact with his wife.2 Nevertheless, Michael went to his wife’s
apartment a couple months after the conviction. The police were called, and
Michael was arrested for violating the No Contact Order.3
Michael did not understand the severity of violating a No Contact
Order. Expecting to be charged with a misdemeanor crime, he was shocked
when the judge announced that he was being indicted with a felony charge of
violating a No Contact Order.4 Before Michael could question the judge, the
court set bail and issued yet another No Contact Order.5 Michael, confused
by what had just occurred, signed the new No Contact Order and was
escorted back to his jail cell.6
Michael is convinced that his constitutional rights have been
infringed upon. Michael alleges the No Contact Order statute is facially
invalid because it violates the due process clause of both the United States
Constitution and Minnesota State Constitution.7 How should the district
court rule?

1

See infra text accompanying notes 98–113 (providing the factual background
of Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177).
2
See infra text accompanying notes 99–100 (stating the criminal charges giving
rise to the first Domestic Abuse No Contact Order (DANCO)).
3
See infra text accompanying notes 106–107 (describing the circumstances
underlying the first DANCO violation).
4
See infra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining why the first DANCO
violation was elevated to a felony offense).
5
See infra text accompanying note 110 (mentioning the issuance of the second
DANCO).
6
See infra text accompanying note 111 (describing the procedural process
followed in the issuance of the second DANCO).
7
See infra text accompanying notes 114–115 (stating Ness’s arguments
challenging the constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 629.75).
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In State v. Ness, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently upheld the
constitutionality of Minnesota Statute § 629.75.8 The statute grants courts the
authority to issue a Domestic Abuse No Contact Order (DANCO) against a
defendant in a criminal proceeding involving domestic abuse, harassment,
stalking, violation of an existing order for protection, or violation of a prior
DANCO.9 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected appellant Bryan Paul
Ness’s arguments that the DANCO statute failed to provide adequate notice
and opportunity to be heard and encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.10 The court concluded that a defendant’s procedural due
process rights are not violated when a DANCO is issued in conjunction with
a pretrial hearing because the pretrial hearing satisfies the DANCO statute’s
hearing requirement.11 Furthermore, the court found that sufficient checks on
judicial discretion exist to eliminate the potential for arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement of the DANCO statute.12
Despite Ness, Minnesota district courts still face uncertainty when
interpreting or applying the DANCO statute.13 Before Ness, no uniform
interpretation or application of the DANCO statute among the Minnesota
district courts existed.14 Even after Ness, uncertainties remain because the
Minnesota legislature has yet to provide clear guidance to courts specifying
under what circumstances a court should issue a DANCO.15 This Note will
8

Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 186 (providing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in

Ness).

9
See MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(a) (2013) (also referred to as the
“DANCO statute”). A DANCO may also be issued against a juvenile offender in a
delinquency proceeding for domestic abuse, harassment or stalking, violation of an order for
protection, or violation of a prior DANCO. Id.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 131–134 (explaining the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s reasoning for upholding the constitutionality of the DANCO statute).
11
See infra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s emphasis on the DANCO statute’s language as evidence of adequate procedural due
process).
12
See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (noting the limitations
imposed by the DANCO statute on judicial discretion).
13
See infra Part IV.C (exploring the uncertainty faced by district courts imposing
DANCOs).
14
See infra note 118 and accompanying text (mentioning the lack of legislative
guidance and standards for district courts). See also Dan Gunderson, Law Protecting Domestic
Abuse Victims Challenged in State Supreme Court, MPR NEWS (Nov. 9, 2012), available at
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/11/09/law/state-supreme-courtconstitutionality-domestic-abuse-no-contact-order (noting that Minnesota district courts
routinely approved DANCOs in domestic abuse cases until Ness’s appeal when some district
courts began to refuse to issue or enforce DANCOs); MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN,
MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION GRANT APPLICATION: MINNESOTA COALITION FOR
BATTERED WOMEN 3 (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.mnbar.org/barfoundation/
Meeting%20Notices/062813/9%20-%20Minnesota%20Coalition%20for%20Battered%20
Women,%20Inc..pdf (“Challenges to the DANCO statute have been routine in District Court
over the past year resulting in confusion and lack of enforcement of orders.”).
15
See State v. Yang, No. A11-1377, 2013 WL 4779014, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 9, 2013) (noting the broad discretion afforded district courts in issuing a DANCO).
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examine the impact of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ness on
criminal defendants’ rights in DANCO proceedings. Part II of this Note
provides an overview of the development of domestic violence law in
Minnesota and describes the various civil and criminal domestic violence
statutes enacted in Minnesota.16 Part III introduces the underlying facts of
Ness and examines the reasoning of the district and appellate courts.17
Part IV argues that while the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding
that the DANCO statute facially provides for adequate notice and
opportunity to be heard was ultimately proper, criminal defendants may still
bring as-applied constitutional challenges against the DANCO statute.18
Further, Part IV contends that the lack of Minnesota legislative guidance on
the issuance of DANCOs does, in part, encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.19 In order to remedy this, Part IV recommends
that the Minnesota legislature amend the DANCO statute to clarify when and
how a DANCO should be issued.20
II. BACKGROUND
Domestic violence statutes are a relatively recent legal
development.21 During the 1970s, public awareness of domestic abuse grew,
and women’s rights advocates began to push for legal intervention in
domestic violence cases.22 In response to significant social pressure, state and
federal legislatures began enacting domestic violence legislation.23
16

See infra Part II (defining domestic abuse and comparing Minnesota’s
domestic violence statutes).
17
See infra Part III (providing the facts triggering Ness’s DANCOs and
discussing the district and appellate courts’ contrasting interpretations of procedural due
process).
18
See infra Part IV.A (asserting that not all criminal defendants will be afforded
sufficient due process).
19
See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the lack of explicit standards renders the
DANCO statute vague).
20
See infra Part IV.C (suggesting the Minnesota legislature amend the DANCO
statute to provide further guidance to courts in interpreting and applying the DANCO statute).
21
See Christine O’Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the
Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 938 (1999) (providing a review of the
development of domestic violence law in the United States).
22
Id. at 938–39 (noting the shift in social perceptions of domestic violence). See
also Nichole Miras Mordini, Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An
Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 295–96,
307–09 (2004) (describing the history of the American battered women’s movement);
Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993) (discussing the
motivations behind domestic violence legal reform efforts).
23
See Mordini, supra note 22, at 317 (noting the social perceptions surrounding
domestic violence). Historically, domestic violence was socially and legally viewed as a
private matter, outside the concerns and reach of the public law. Id. As a result, it took
decades for women’s and victims’ rights advocates to combat the stereotypes surrounding
domestic violence and to pressure state legislatures to create laws addressing it. Id. at 317–18.
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Minnesota was among the first states to enact domestic violence legislation,
codifying its first laws in 1979.24 The Minnesota legislature has periodically
revised and updated its domestic violence laws to ensure that the laws
effectively protect victims of domestic violence.25
A. Defining Domestic Abuse
A single definition is incapable of capturing the diversity of
domestic abuse and domestic violence.26 As a result, there is often a
disconnect between victims’ experiences of domestic violence and the law.27
Minnesota broadly defines domestic violence and domestic abuse in an effort
to ensure victims’ experiences align with the text of the law.28 Under
Minnesota law, “domestic abuse” is defined as:
the following, if committed against a family or household
member by a family or household member: (1) physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault; (2) the infliction of fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3)
24
See Shannon M. Heim, Revisions to Minnesota Domestic Violence Law Affords
Greater Protection to Vulnerable Victims, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 950, 955 (2011)
(discussing the legislative history of Minnesota’s domestic violence statutes). Minnesota’s
Domestic Abuse Act, MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, was codified into law on May 25, 1979. Laws
of Minnesota for 1979, Chapter 214–H.F. No. 521, 1979 Leg., 71st Sess. 414, 417 (Minn.
1979), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/law/1979/0/1979-214.pdf (stating
the Domestic Abuse Act’s codification date). The original Domestic Abuse Act statute stated
that it was an act “relating to domestic abuse; authorizing judicial intervention to provide
protection from abuse; prescribing penalties.” Id. at 414 (detailing the purpose and scope of
the Domestic Abuse Act).
25
Heim, supra note 24, at 955–56 (noting the evolution of Minnesota’s domestic
violence laws). Since 1979, the Minnesota legislature has amended the Domestic Abuse Act to
expand its scope, provide stricter penalties for violations, and afford an additional, criminal
basis for protection. Id.
26
See Mordini, supra note 22, at 300 (remarking on the diversity of domestic
abuse definitions); Klein & Orloff, supra note 22, at 810 (noting that domestic violence “is an
exceedingly complex problem, presenting many unique challenges”). For example, many
service providers and counseling programs broadly define domestic abuse to include both
physical and psychological abuse. Mordini, supra note 22, at 300–01. Conversely, some state
statutes exclude relationships where no physical violence or threat of bodily harm has
occurred. Id.
27
Mordini, supra note 22, at 300–01 (discussing the differences between
advocates’ definitions of domestic abuse and battery and the legal definitions).
28
Unlike some state statutes, Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act does not require
physical violence in order for domestic abuse to have occurred. See generally Mordini, supra
note 22, at 300–01 (providing examples of non-inclusive legal definitions of domestic abuse,
such as statutes that require physical violence or threat of bodily harm occur in order for an act
to be classified as domestic abuse). This allows more victims of domestic violence to seek
legal protection from their abusers. Id. As a result, Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act is a
positive example for other states in drafting the language for domestic violence laws. Heim,
supra note 24, at 953 (noting that academics and lawmakers look to Minnesota law for a
positive example of domestic violence laws).
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terroristic threats . . . criminal sexual conduct . . . or
interference with an emergency call.29
Additionally, Minnesota’s definition of “family or household members”
encompasses not only individuals related to one another but also persons
who have resided together in the past or are involved in a significant
romantic or sexual relationship with one another.30 This Note will use the
broad definition of domestic abuse encompassed in the Minnesota Domestic
Abuse Act.31
B. Minnesota’s Domestic Violence Statutes
Minnesota’s domestic violence legislation consists of three statutes,
two civil and one criminal.32 Each of these statutes provides a separate basis
29
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 2(a) (2013) (providing Minnesota’s legal
definition of domestic abuse). The Domestic Abuse Act cross-references the definitions of
terroristic threats, criminal sexual conduct, and interference with an emergency call with other
Minnesota statute provisions. Id. Those provisions are: MINN. STAT. § 609.713, subdiv. 1
(2013) (providing the meaning of terroristic threats); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342, 609.344,
609.345, and 609.3451 (2013) (defining criminal sexual conduct); and MINN. STAT. § 609.78,
subdiv. 2 (2013) (stating what constitutes interference with an emergency call). Id. “Physical
harm, bodily injury, and assault” include hitting, kicking, slapping, pushing, and stabbing. See
Minnesota Judicial Branch, Court Forms, Instructions to Apply for an OFP, *1–2 (2013),
available
at
http://www.mncourts.gov/forms/public/forms/Domestic_Abuse/Order_for_
Protection/OFP101.pdf (providing examples of the types of acts that constitute domestic
abuse). “Fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” includes verbal threats to
kill, break bones, or threats to harm someone with a knife or gun. Id. “Criminal sexual
conduct” includes forced sex or forced contact with intimate body parts. Id. “Interference with
an emergency call” includes intentionally interrupting or preventing someone from placing an
emergency call. Id. A six year statute of limitations applies to acts that meet the definition of
domestic abuse. MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(10) (2013).
30
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 2(b) (noting the scope of Minnesota’s
Domestic Abuse Act). The Domestic Abuse Act defines “family or household members” to
mean:
(1) spouses and former spouses; (2) parents and children; (3) persons
related by blood; (4) persons who are presently residing together or who
have resided together in the past; (5) persons who have a child in common
regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any
time; (6) a man and a woman if the woman is pregnant and the man is
alleged to be the father, regardless of whether they have been married or
lived together at any time; and (7) persons involved in a significant
romantic or sexual relationship.
Id.
31
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining why Minnesota’s
Domestic Abuse Statute is a positive example of domestic violence laws).
32
See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4 (providing for a civil Order for
Protection); MINN. STAT. § 609.748 (2013) (establishing a civil Harassment Restraining
Order); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 22 (affording for a criminal Domestic Abuse No
Contact Order). MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 22 was repealed by the Minnesota
Legislature in 2010 and replaced by MINN. STAT. § 629.75, the current DANCO statute. Laws
of Minnesota for 2010, Chapter 299–S.F. No. 2437 1, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess., at 1 (Minn.

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss2/8

6

Servaty: DANCO Proceedings

2014]

DANCO PROCEEDINGS

459

for a court to intervene and protect victims of domestic violence.33 The
Minnesota legislature has steadily strengthened its domestic violence laws
over the past decade, imposing harsher criminal penalties on abusers while
improving protections for victims.34
1. Order for Protection
A civil Order for Protection (OFP) is an important judicial tool for
protecting victims of domestic violence.35 OFPs allow victims of domestic
abuse, as well as the victims’ families or household members, to petition a
civil court for a protective order against their abusers.36 An OFP is a court
order forbidding the abuser from physically harming or causing fear of
immediate physical harm to the victim of domestic abuse.37 A court does not
automatically grant OFPs; generally, in order to receive an OFP, the victim
(or victim’s family or household member) must file a petition with the court
and attend a judicial hearing.38 The petition must allege the existence of
2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/law/2010/0/2010-299.pdf
(describing the law as “[a]n act . . . recodifying and clarifying the domestic abuse no contact
order law”).
33
Heim, supra note 24, at 962 (“[O]rders for protection and no contact orders
represent some of the most important opportunities to shield victims of domestic violence.”).
Civil protective orders are issued at a petitioner’s request through a civil court process. State
v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177 (2013).
Conversely, criminal protective orders are issued by a court against a defendant in a criminal
proceeding. Id. This distinction was very important to both the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
and Minnesota Supreme Court’s analyses of whether MINN. STAT. § 629.75 provided adequate
notice and opportunity to be heard. Id. at 223, 226. See also Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 184.
34
Heim, supra note 24, at 956 (noting the evolution of Minnesota’s domestic
abuse statutes).
35
Klein & Orloff, supra note 22, at 811 (noting the importance of court
intervention in protecting domestic violence victims).
36
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4(a) (stating who may file an OFP petition).
See Rebecca Pirius, Minn. House of Representatives, Domestic Abuse Laws in Minnesota: An
Overview, *4 (2012), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/domabuse.pdf
(discussing the scope of an OFP). In an OFP proceeding, the court may issue an order
(1) restraining the abusing party from committing acts of domestic violence; (2) excluding the
abusing party from the dwelling that the parties share or from the residence of the petitioner;
(3) requiring the abusing party participate in treatment or counseling services; (4) prohibiting
the abusing party from contacting the petitioner in person, by phone, mail, email, or
messaging, through a third-party, or by any other means; and (5) imposing, in its discretion,
other relief it deems necessary for the protection of a family or household member. See MINN.
STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 6(a) (listing the type of relief a court may grant in an OFP
proceeding).
37
Pirius, supra note 36, at *4 (describing the purpose of an OFP).
38
See Minnesota Judicial Branch, Sixth Judicial District, Carlton County, Filing
for an Order for Protection (OFP): How to Obtain an Order for Protection (2013), available
at http://www.mncourts.gov/district/6/?page=1575 [hereinafter Filing for an OFP] (noting
that a petition must be filed with the court in order for an OFP to be issued). Not all cases
require a judicial hearing be held. Id. A hearing is only required if a party or the court requests
one be held. Id.
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domestic abuse, as defined by Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act, and be
accompanied by an affidavit stating the specific facts and circumstances
from which judicial relief is sought.39 The petitioner must also state whether
she or he has ever had an OFP in effect against the alleged abuser.40
Domestic violence advocates often assist victims of domestic violence with
the legal process of obtaining an OFP.41
The petitioner has two options once the petition is filed.42 The
petitioner may request the issuance of an ex parte order, which is a
temporary protective order.43 An ex parte order restricts the alleged abuser’s
access to the victim during the adjudication process and is effective upon
notice and service of the order on the alleged abuser (respondent).44 The ex
parte order, however, is limited in scope.45 A more permanent OFP is
required when a petitioner seeks relief beyond the scope of the ex parte
order.46
39

MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4(b) (listing the OFP petition requirements).
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4(c) (imposing an additional requirement that
a petitioner must satisfy before an OFP will be issued).
41
Klein & Orloff, supra note 22, at 843–46 (noting that there has been an
increase in the need for legal assistance in the form of battered women’s advocates because
the majority of protective order petitioners are pro se).
42
Filing for an OFP, supra note 38 (describing the OFP petition process). A
petitioner may request a temporary OFP be issued in lieu of, or in addition to, a permanent
OFP. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv.5 (providing for a temporary OFP).
43
Filing for an OFP, supra note 38 (defining an ex parte order). To obtain an ex
parte order, the petitioner must successfully allege an immediate and present danger of
domestic abuse. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 7(a). See also Theresa A. Capistrant &
Rebecca Wong, Orders for Protection: When the Shield Becomes a Sword, 65 BENCH & BAR
MINN., Mar. 2008, available at http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2008/mar08/ofp.htm
(discussing the process of obtaining an ex parte OFP and its effects on alleged abusers).
44
Filing for an OFP, supra note 38 (stating the type of relief granted by an ex
parte order).
45
Minnesota Judicial Branch, Second Judicial District, Ramsey County, OFP
FAQs: What Happens at Court? (2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/
district/2/?page=1173 [hereinafter OFP FAQs] (noting the differences between an ex parte
order and a permanent OFP). An ex parte order may only grant relief by: (1) restraining the
abusing party from committing acts of domestic abuse; (2) excluding the abusing party from
the dwelling that the parties share or from the residence of the petitioner; (3) excluding the
abusing party from petitioner’s place of employment; (4) ordering the abusing party to have
no contact with the petitioner; (5) continuing all currently available insurance coverage; and
(6) providing for the care and treatment of animals owned by the parties. MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01, subdiv. 7(a). If an ex parte order has been issued and the petitioner seeks only the
relief provided under MINN. STAT. §518B.01, subdiv. 7, then no hearing is required unless the
court declines to order the requested relief or one of the parties requests a hearing. MINN.
STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 5(a)–(b). If no hearing is required or requested, the ex parte order is
effective for a fixed period of time, as determined by the court or until modified by the court
pursuant to a judicial hearing. MINN. STAT. §518B.01, subdiv. 7(c). See also MINN. STAT.
§518B.01, subdiv. 6(b) (“[A]ny relief granted by an order for protection may be for a period
not to exceed two years, except when the court determines a longer period is appropriate.”).
46
OFP FAQs, supra note 45 (noting when a permanent OFP is required). A
hearing may be requested by either the petitioner or respondent, ordered by the judge, or
required by the court if relief requested includes child support or spousal maintenance,
40
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The second option is to request an OFP at a judicial hearing. At the
judicial hearing, both the petitioner and respondent are afforded an
opportunity to speak on their behalf.47 The respondent is given the option of
admitting to the alleged domestic abuse, denying abuse occurred but
agreeing to the order, or denying abuse occurred and requesting an
evidentiary hearing.48 Both parties may present evidence and witness
testimony supporting their position at the evidentiary hearing.49 The judge
will then evaluate the evidence and render a decision.50 If the judge finds
domestic abuse occurred, an OFP will be entered against the respondent.51
Violation of an OFP is subject to criminal penalties.52 A court may also issue
a DANCO against a defendant in a criminal proceeding for violation of an
OFP.53

custody, treatment or counseling, restitution, or a distance provision. Id. The hearing must
occur within fourteen days from the date it was requested or ordered. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01,
subdiv. 5(a) (stating a specific period of time in which an OFP judicial hearing must occur).
47
OFP FAQs, supra note 45 (discussing the OFP judicial hearing).
48
Capistrant & Wong, supra note 43 (listing the choices a respondent has to
choose from at the OFP judicial hearing).
49
OFP FAQs, supra note 45 (noting that both parties are afforded an opportunity
to be heard).
50
Id. (stating that the court considers all evidence presented before issuing an
OFP). A district court must find probable cause that abuse occurred in order to issue an OFP.
Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 184 (citing Vogt v. Vogt, 455 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Minn. 1990) (noting
that the issuance of an OFP implies the court found probable cause of physical abuse)).
Minnesota case law has established a broad range of acts that may warrant an OFP. Klein &
Orloff, supra note 22, at 848 (citing Knuth v. Knuth, No. C1-92-482, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS
696, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 19, 1992) (holding that the Domestic Abuse Act does not
require an overt physical act occur to support issuance of a protection order, and noting that
past abusive behavior is a factor in determining cause for an order for protection)). Those acts
include not only overt physical acts but also verbal threats to inflict fear of imminent physical
harm. Id.
51
OFP FAQs, supra note 45 (discussing when an OFP will be issued). The OFP
is effective for up to two years, and may be modified or extended at the request of the
petitioner. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 6(b).
52
Pirius, supra note 36, at *12 (describing the consequences of violating an
OFP). Minnesota law provides misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony penalties for a
violation of an OFP issued under the Domestic Abuse Act. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01,
subdiv. 14 (listing the criminal penalties for violating an OFP). The law establishes minimum
sentences to be applied to misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony convictions, as well
as requiring the court to order the defendant to participate in counseling or other appropriate
programs selected by the court. Id.
53
Pirius, supra note 36, at *12 (noting the connection between all three of
Minnesota’s domestic abuse statutes). See MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(a)(4) (listing
violation of an OFP as a basis for issuing a DANCO).
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2. Harassment Restraining Order
Like an OFP, a Harassment Restraining Order (HRO) is a civil
protection order that restricts an actor’s contact with his or her victim.54
Unlike OFPs, HROs must be petitioned for by and issued on behalf of a
harassment victim.55 Furthermore, HROs are much narrower in scope than
OFPs.56 Nevertheless, HROs are still an effective tool for protecting victims
from abusers because there is no relationship requirement between the
parties.57
The judicial process of obtaining a HRO is similar to that of an OFP
in that a victim of harassment must petition a court and request relief
pursuant to the HRO statute.58 The petition must allege sufficient facts
showing harassment occurred and include an affidavit stating the specific

54

See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION: HARASSMENT
RESTRAINING ORDERS, at *1 (2013), available at http://www.lmc.org/media/
document/1/harassmentrestrainingordersupdate2013.pdf?inline=true
(mentioning
the
similarities between Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes). Minnesota law defines
“harassment” as:
(1) a single incident of physical or sexual assault or repeated incidents of
intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial
adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the
safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship
between the actor and the intended target; (2) targeted residential
picketing; and (3) a pattern of attending public events after being notified
that the actor’s presence at the event is harassing to another.
MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 1(a).
55
LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 54, at *1 (noting the differences between
Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes). However, when the victim of harassment is a minor, the
parent, guardian, or stepparent of the minor may seek a restraining order from the court on
behalf of the minor. MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 2.
56
For instance, a HRO may only “(1) [order] the respondent to cease or avoid the
harassment of another person; or (2) [order] the respondent to have no contact with another
person.” MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 5(a). Additionally, Minnesota case law has narrowly
interpreted the definition of “physical assault” within the HRO statute to encompass only “the
intentional infliction of or an attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.” LEAGUE OF MINN.
CITIES, supra note 54, at *2 (citing Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 762–63 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2008)). Similarly, only certain types of words can be considered harassing. Id. In order
to constitute harassment, words or comments must be more than inappropriate or
argumentative—they must be “fighting words” or “true threats.” Id. (citing Dunham v. Roer,
708 N.W.2d 552, 565–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (defining “fighting words” as words that a
reasonable person would understand as being likely to cause the average person to fight and
defining “true threats” as comments where the speaker means to communicate a serious intent
to commit unlawful violence against a person)).
57
LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 54, at *1 (noting that the lack of a familial
relationship requirement allows more victims of harassment to seek judicial protection from
their harassers).
58
Compare MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4 (stating the requirements for
obtaining an OFP), with MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 3(a) (describing the process of
requesting a HRO).
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facts and circumstances from which judicial relief is sought.59 The petition
must also state whether the petitioner has had a previous restraining order in
effect against the respondent.60 A temporary restraining order may be issued,
but its relief is limited.61 A respondent may request a judicial hearing to
challenge the contents of the HRO petition.62 The court must find that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in
harassment to grant the HRO.63 A HRO will be entered against the
respondent if the judge determines harassment occurred.64 Violation of a
HRO is subject to criminal penalties.65
3. Domestic Abuse No Contact Order
A DANCO is a criminal protection order issued by a judicial court
against a criminal defendant.66 Criminal no contact orders are an effective
59
MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 3(a) (listing the HRO petition requirements).
The petition must allege facts sufficient to establish the identity of the alleged harassment
victim (petitioner), of the alleged actor (respondent), and that the respondent has engaged in
harassment. Id.
60
Id. (stating an additional petition requirement that must be satisfied before an
HRO will be issued).
61
MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 4(b) (allowing for a temporary HRO to be
issued in limited circumstances). A temporary restraining order is only available if the petition
sufficiently alleges an immediate and present danger of harassment. Id.
62
MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 5(b) (affording a respondent the opportunity to
be heard before a HRO is issued).
63
MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 5(b)(3) (stating when a court may issue a
HRO).
64
Id. (noting that the court must find “reasonable grounds to believe that the
respondent has engaged in harassment” before issuing a HRO).
65
MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 6 (listing the criminal penalties for violating a
HRO). See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 54, at *3 (discussing the consequences of
violating a HRO). Minnesota law provides misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony
penalties for violation of a HRO and establishes minimum sentences to be imposed, dependent
on the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. Unlike OFPs, a violation of a HRO issued
pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 609.748 does not create a basis for imposition of a DANCO. Id.
However, if the HRO is committed against a family or household member and issued pursuant
to MINN. STAT. § 609.749, then the court may impose a DANCO against a criminal defendant
in a proceeding addressing the HRO violation. MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(a)(2) (listing
violation of a HRO as a basis for issuing a DANCO).
66
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 223 (differentiating DANCOs from OFPs and HROs). A
DANCO “may be issued” at the discretion of the judicial officer. MINN. STAT. 629.75, subdiv.
1(b). See also State v. Milner, No. A-12-2137, 2013 WL 6152174, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov.
25, 2013) (noting that district courts may exercise discretion in determining when to issue a
DANCO because the DANCO statute does not require its issuance). A pretrial DANCO is
generally issued at a criminal defendant’s first court appearance. SECOND JUDICIAL DIST.
VIOLENCE COORDINATING COUNCIL, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR DOMESTIC ABUSERELATED CRIMINAL CASES 34 (4th ed. 2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/
Documents/2/Public/Criminal_Court/Guidelines_DA_Related_Cases_Crim.pdf
(providing
guidance to courts in handling domestic abuse-related cases). Judges are encouraged to issue
DANCOs “whenever applicable.” Id. The order itself is typically filled out before the court
hearing by the city or county attorney’s office. Id. The order includes the name and identifying
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tool to help protect victims of domestic violence while the abuser is in the
midst of criminal prosecution.67 They are designed to prevent individuals
who have been arrested for domestic violence-related offenses from
contacting their victim.68 Minnesota has two types of DANCOs: (1) pretrial
orders issued prior to final disposition of an underlying criminal matter and
(2) post-conviction probationary orders.69 Regardless of which type of
DANCO is being imposed on a criminal defendant, it must be issued in
conjunction with a criminal proceeding in which the defendant is being
charged with or convicted of a domestic violence-related offense.70
In 2010, the Minnesota legislature revised the DANCO statute.71 The
new DANCO statute sought to clarify the original DANCO statute.72 The
information of the defendant and victim(s) and addresses of locations where the defendant is
prohibited from going. Id. at 34, 69. Additionally, the order states that the defendant is
prohibited from having contact with the victim and that a violation of the order is a crime and
may result in the defendant being arrested and charged with further criminal offenses. Id. at
69. The defendant receives a copy of the DANCO after the order is signed by the judge. Id. at
34. The DANCO remains in effect until the final disposition of the case unless modified or
cancelled by written court order before the final disposition. Id. Judges are discouraged from
canceling a pretrial DANCO before final disposition of the underlying criminal matter. Id. at
35. The court considers the facts of the case, stated wishes of the victim and defendant,
defendant’s criminal history, current posture of the case, and position of the prosecutor in
determining whether to cancel an existing pretrial DANCO. Id.
67
Jennifer G. Long et al., Model Policy For Prosecutors and Judges on
Imposing, Modifying and Lifting Criminal No Contact Orders, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST.
PROJECT, 2 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/articles/Prosecutors_
Model_Policy_No_Contact_Orders.pdf (discussing the effectiveness of DANCOs in
protecting domestic abuse victims). DANCOs are routinely issued in domestic abuse cases;
approximately 11,000 DANCOs were issued by Minnesota judges in 2012. Patrick Thornton,
All Sides Watching DANCO Challenge at Minnesota Supreme Court, MINN. LAW. (Jan. 4,
2013) (noting the significant number of DANCOs issued by Minnesota district courts in
2012).
68
Long et al., supra note 67, at 2 (stating the purpose of issuing a DANCO
against a criminal defendant). Prosecutors often seek DANCOs to protect victims from being
intimidated or coerced by their abusers during the adjudication process. Thornton, supra note
67 (noting the motivations of prosecutors for requesting DANCOs). See also Gunderson,
supra note 14 (noting that the Clay County prosecutor requests a DANCO in every domestic
abuse case to protect domestic abuse victims).
69
MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(b) (providing for the issuance of a pretrial
DANCO or probationary DANCO).
70
See MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(a) (stipulating the types of criminal
proceedings that may be the basis for imposing a DANCO). To impose a DANCO, the
criminal defendant must be before the court in a proceeding for: (1) domestic abuse, (2)
harassment or stalking of a family or household member, (3) an OFP violation, or (4) a prior
DANCO violation. Id. The DANCO itself is “independent of any condition of pretrial release
or probation imposed on the defendant . . . [and] may be issued in addition to a similar
restriction imposed as a condition of pretrial release or probation.” MINN. STAT. § 629.75,
subdiv. 1(b).
71
Laws of Minnesota for 2010, supra note 32 (discussing the changes made to
Minnesota’s DANCO statute).
72
Id. (stating the Minnesota legislature’s purpose for replacing MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01, subdiv. 22 with MINN. STAT. § 629.75).
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Minnesota legislature also imposed stricter criminal penalties for violation of
a DANCO.73 In 2013, the Minnesota legislature eliminated the knowledge
requirement from the statute.74
C. Challenging the Constitutionality of Minnesota’s Domestic Violence
Statutes
Minnesota courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of
Minnesota’s civil domestic violence statutes.75 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals has held that a defendant may not challenge the constitutionality of
an OFP or HRO after it has been issued in another judicial proceeding.76 The
court explained that a defendant is estopped from appealing a protective
order at a subsequent hearing because he had a prior opportunity to directly
appeal the protective order and, hence, the matter was finalized.77

73

Heim, supra note 24, at 958–59 (noting the differences between MINN. STAT.
§518B.01, subdiv. 22 and MINN. STAT. § 629.75). The new statute’s language makes it a gross
misdemeanor offense to violate a DANCO within ten years of a “previous qualified domestic
violence-related offense conviction.” MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 2(c). A felony offense
occurs when the DANCO violation occurs within ten years of the first of two or more
“qualified domestic violence related offense convictions” or if the violation occurs while the
violator is in possession of a dangerous weapon. MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 2(d).
74
See Laws of Minnesota for 2013, Chapter 47–H.F. No. 1400, 2013 Leg., 88th
Sess., at 4 (Minn. 2013), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/law/
2013/0/2013-047.pdf (indicating the changes made to MINN. STAT. § 629.75 in 2013). As a
result, a criminal defendant may be convicted for inadvertently violating the DANCO statute.
See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION: 2013 LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 2
(2013), available at http://lmc.org/media/document/1/2013legislativeupdate.pdf?inline=true
(highlighting the changes made to Minnesota’s domestic violence protective order statutes).
75
Trial Court Memorandum at 6–7, State v. Ness, 2012 WL 9082737 (Clay
County Feb. 9, 2012) (No. 14–CR–11–815), 2012 WL 9045545 (discussing the viability of
constitutional challenges to Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes).
76
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 223 (noting that a defendant may not challenge the
issuance of a civil protective order in a subsequent proceeding addressing a violation of the
order). In its determination, the Minnesota Court of Appeals relied on the prohibition of a
defendant from “collaterally attacking” a protective order after it has been issued. Id. A
collateral attack is “an attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal.” Id.
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “collateral attack”)).
77
Id. (discussing why a defendant may not collaterally attack a civil protective
order). A defendant’s right to appeal a civil order is governed by Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
103.03(g). Id. (stating that a civil defendant may appeal a final order, decision, or judgment
resulting from an administrative or special proceeding to the court of appeals). See State v.
Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884, 889–90 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a defendant charged
with violating an OFP could not collaterally attack the OFP because the defendant had the
right to directly appeal the issuance of the OFP, but chose not to); see also State v. Harrington,
504 N.W.2d 500, 502–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a defendant who failed to
appeal the validity of a HRO within the statutory appeal time could not collaterally attack the
HRO in a subsequent criminal proceeding in which he was charged with violating the HRO).
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A DANCO may be issued as a pretrial order prior to final disposition
of an underlying criminal matter or as a post-conviction probationary order.78
Post-conviction probationary DANCOs may be appealed along with the
underlying conviction as a final judgment and order of the court.79 Pretrial
DANCOs, however, are distinguishable from OFPs, HROs, and postconviction probationary DANCOs because they cannot be directly
appealed.80 A criminal defendant may challenge the issuance of a pretrial
DANCO in a subsequent proceeding for violation of that DANCO.81
The constitutionality of Minnesota’s DANCO statute has been
challenged primarily on grounds of violating a criminal defendant’s
constitutional right to due process of law.82 A defendant may challenge the
constitutionality of a law by either arguing it is invalid on its face (facial
challenge) or that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant’s
78

MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(b) (stating the two types of DANCOs a court

may issue).

79

Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 224 (noting that a defendant may directly appeal the
issuance of a probationary DANCO because probationary DANCOs are issued after the final
disposition of the underlying criminal matter). A criminal defendant’s right to appeal a
criminal order to the court of appeals is governed by Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subdivs. 1–2.
Id. A criminal defendant may appeal adverse final judgments, sentences, or orders allowing or
imposing conditions of release. Id.
80
Id. (noting that pretrial DANCOs are an exception to the collateral attack
prohibition). DANCOs are not final orders of the court and therefore cannot be appealed
pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02. Id.
81
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 224 (discussing why a pretrial DANCO should be treated
differently than Minnesota’s other protective orders). A defendant in a pretrial DANCO
hearing does not have a clear right to immediately appeal the issuance of the pretrial DANCO.
Id. As a result, the defendant may collaterally attack the issuance of the pretrial DANCO in a
subsequent proceeding for violation of that DANCO. Id. (distinguishing Davis v. Danielson,
558 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a defendant cannot collaterally
attack a district court order when the order is directly appealable)).
82
See, e.g., State v. Achin, Nos. A12-0437, A12-438, 2012 WL 4774670 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2012), stay and review granted, (Minn. Dec. 18, 2012), review denied and
stay vacated, (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) (arguing that MINN. STAT. § 629.75 is unconstitutional
because it violates a defendant’s due process rights); State v. Jones, No. A12-0016, 2012 WL
5381847 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 05, 2012), stay and review granted, (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013),
review denied and stay vacated, (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) (maintaining that MINN. STAT.
§ 629.75 is unconstitutional because it violates procedural due process, substantive due
process, and is unconstitutionally vague); State v. Minnick, No. A12-0131, 2012 WL 5381850
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 05, 2012), stay and review granted, (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013), review
denied and stay vacated, (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) (contending that MINN. STAT. § 629.75
violates a defendant’s procedural and substantive due process rights). The Minnesota Supreme
Court postponed reviewing these cases until after Ness. See State v. Achin, 2012 Minn.
LEXIS 705 (Minn. Dec. 18, 2012) (“[F]urther proceedings are stayed pending final
disposition of State v. Ness . . . .”); State v. Jones, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 56 (Minn. Jan. 29,
2013); State v. Minnick, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 55 (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013). The court subsequently
denied review of the cases after declaring Minnesota’s DANCO statute does not violate a
defendant’s due process rights in Ness. See State v. Achin, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 435 (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2013) (denying review of the petition); State v. Jones, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 442
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) (stating that the Ness opinion was filed July 24, 2013 and denying
review of the petition); State v. Minnick, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 434 (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
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particular circumstances (as-applied challenge).83 In a facial challenge a
defendant must prove no application of the law would be constitutional.84 In
an as-applied challenge, however, a defendant must show that while the law
is generally constitutional, it was unconstitutionally applied to the
defendant.85 Facial challenges render the entire law unconstitutional.86
Conversely, as-applied challenges only render the law unconstitutional
concerning that particular defendant’s case.87
Every defendant is afforded a constitutional right to due process of
law.88 The due process provision of the United States Constitution states “no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.”89 Similarly, the due process provision of the Minnesota Constitution
provides that “no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.”90 Both the United States Constitution and
Minnesota Constitution require a person receive adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard before being deprived of life, liberty, or property.91
In determining whether a person’s right to procedural due process has been
violated, the court must first conclude that a protected liberty is implicated.92
If a protected liberty is implicated, the court must then determine what
process is due by applying a balancing test.93 While the Minnesota Court of
Appeals has ruled that a protected liberty is implicated in a DANCO

83
Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 657–58 (2010) (discussing the two types of constitutional challenges).
84
Id. at 657 (explaining the defendant’s burden in a facial challenge).
85
Id. (distinguishing facial challenges from as-applied challenges).
86
Id. at 658 (advising against the use of facial challenges because they render an
entire law unconstitutional).
87
Id. (noting that courts favor as-applied challenges because they allow for some
deference to the legislative process).
88
See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing procedural due process of law). The basic requirements of
procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id.
89
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 225 (quoting U.S. CONST. amends. Vl, XIV § 1).
90
Id. (quoting MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7).
91
Id. (quoting Christopher v. Windom Area Sch. Bd., 781 N.W.2d 904, 911
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010)).
92
Id. (describing the analysis a court must undergo in determining whether due
process of law has been adequately afforded).
93
Id. (explaining the due process analysis arose out of the United States Supreme
Court case, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). In undergoing the analysis, a court
must balance:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the governmental action;
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures
used and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substantive procedural requirements would entail.
Id.
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proceeding, it has yet to find a case in which the liberty is deprived to such
an extent as to render the DANCO statute unconstitutional.94
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In State v. Ness, the Minnesota Supreme Court further limited the
ability of criminal defendants to challenge the constitutionality of the
DANCO statute.95 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota
Statute § 629.75 does not facially violate a defendant’s right to procedural
due process because of the context in which the DANCO is issued. 96 The
DANCO statute provides a defendant with constitutionally sufficient due
process of law through notice of and opportunity to be heard at the
underlying criminal matter’s proceeding.97
A. Factual Background
On January 27, 2011, Bryan Paul Ness was arrested for allegedly
assaulting his wife, N.R.N.98 Ness was ultimately charged with gross
misdemeanor child endangerment, gross misdemeanor domestic assault,

94

Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 228 (applying the Mathews balancing test to the facts of
Ness). The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that the private interest at stake is the
defendant’s right to contact a family or household member. Id. As a result, this interest and the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of it through unfair process must be balanced against the
nature of the government’s interest. Id. The court found that there was a significant enough
state interest in protecting the victims of domestic violence and upholding the integrity of the
judicial process to warrant upholding the constitutionality of the DANCO statute. Id.
95
Id. at 183–86 (explaining the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning in
rejecting Ness’s facial procedural due process challenge).
96
Id. at 182–83 (emphasizing the “immediately following” language of MINN.
STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(c)).
97
Id. at 183 n.4 (summarizing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding). The
Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that a defendant may still bring an as-applied
constitutional challenge to determine whether that particular defendant received
constitutionally sufficient notice of the DANCO prior to its issuance. Id. Following Ness, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has rejected criminal defendants’ contentions that the DANCO
statute violates procedural due process. See, e.g., Milner, 2013 WL 6152174, at *3 (rejecting a
criminal defendant’s procedural due process challenge to the DANCO statute due to the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Ness). Even so, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has
not yet barred as-applied constitutional challenges, noting “Ness left open the possibility of asapplied challenges”. Id. Furthermore, in Milner, the Minnesota Court of Appeals questioned
whether the district court complied with the DANCO statute in issuing the DANCO against
Milner, stating “[t]he record does not clearly reveal that a separate proceeding was held for the
purpose of issuing the order.” Id. at *3 n.1. The court, however, did not address the potential
due process violation because Milner had not raised the issue on appeal. Id.
98
Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at *3–5, State v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 219
(Minn. 2012) (Nos. A12-290, A12-291), 2012 WL 8747569 (describing the events leading to
the first DANCO).
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gross misdemeanor fifth degree assault, and misdemeanor domestic assault.99
During the initial hearing, the district court issued a pretrial DANCO
(DANCO 1) pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1(b),
prohibiting Ness from contacting N.R.N. and going near N.R.N.’s place of
residence.100 Ness, present and represented by counsel at the hearing, signed
DANCO 1.101 Ness was also served with a copy of DANCO 1 following the
hearing.102
Ness and his attorney appeared in court on February 14, 2011, and
entered a guilty plea to a misdemeanor domestic assault charge.103 The court
accepted the guilty plea and Ness requested an amendment to DANCO 1 to
allow him supervised visits with his children.104 The court granted Ness’s
request.105
On March 6, 2011, Ness went to N.R.N’s apartment and refused to
leave.106 Police were called and Ness was arrested and charged with violating
DANCO 1.107 The DANCO 1 violation was enhanced to a felony offense
because Ness had two “previous qualified domestic violence related
convictions” within the past ten years.108 On March 7, 2011, Ness appeared
before the district court for the DANCO 1 violation.109 The court issued a
new pretrial DANCO (DANCO 2) that prohibited Ness from contacting
99

Id. at *5 (listing the criminal offenses Ness was ultimately charged with
stemming from the January 27, 2011, incident).
100
Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, at *5 (discussing the scope
of the first DANCO). DANCO 1 is the first of four DANCOs ultimately issued in this case. Id.
at *5–9. DANCO 2 was issued following Ness’s first felony DANCO violation. Id. at *7.
DANCO 3 was a probationary DANCO issued at sentencing for the fifth-degree misdemeanor
assault. Id. at *7–8. DANCO 4 was issued following Ness’s second felony DANCO violation.
Id. at *9. Of the four DANCOs, only DANCO 1 and DANCO 2 are the subjects of Ness’s due
process challenge. Id. at *5, 7.
101
Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, *5 (explaining the
circumstances in which DANCO 1 was issued).
102
Id. (mentioning that Ness received a copy of DANCO 1).
103
Id. (stating Ness pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor domestic violence-related
offense).
104
Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, at *5–6 (discussing Ness’s
request for modification of DANCO 1).
105
Id. (noting the court did modify DANCO 1). In granting the request the court
reminded Ness not to have any contact with N.R.N. and that any further contact would result
in a new charge for violating the DANCO. Id.
106
Id. at *6 (describing the events leading to the first DANCO violation).
107
Id. at *6–7 (establishing Ness’s arrest for violating DANCO 1).
108
Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, at *6–7 (discussing why
Ness’s DANCO violation was enhanced to a felony-level offense). In addition to the guilty
plea to domestic assault on February 14, 2011, Ness had a prior conviction for fifth-degree
assault in 2009. Id. at *7. Qualified domestic violence-related offenses (QDVROs) include:
“first and second-degree murder; assault; domestic assault; criminal sexual conduct; malicious
punishment of a child; stalking; interference with an emergency call; terroristic threats; and
violating an existing order for protection, ex parte order for protection, HRO, or domestic
abuse no contact order.” MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 16 (2013).
109
Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, at *7 (mentioning Ness was
present at the judicial hearing for the first DANCO violation).
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N.R.N. and restricted him from going to N.R.N.’s residence.110 Ness was
personally served with the new order and signed it.111 On November 23,
2011, Ness once again appeared at N.R.N.’s apartment and refused to
leave.112 Police arrested Ness and he was charged with a felony violation of a
DANCO and gross misdemeanor obstructing legal process.113
B. Procedural Background
In January 2012, Ness filed a motion with the Clay County District
Court to dismiss the felony DANCO violation charges.114 Ness argued that
Minnesota Statute § 629.75 is facially unconstitutional because it violates a
criminal defendant’s right to procedural due process under the United States
and Minnesota Constitutions.115 The district court agreed, holding that the
DANCO statute is unconstitutional on due-process grounds.116 The district
court emphasized the lack of effective procedural options available to
criminal defendants for contesting the issuance of a DANCO.117
Furthermore, the district court criticized the lack of legislative guidance or

110
Id. (noting the scope of the second DANCO). On April 4, 2011, the district
court modified DANCO 2 to allow Ness to have telephone contact with N.R.N., and Ness
signed the modified order. Id.
111
Id. (stating Ness received a copy of DANCO 2 after the judicial hearing).
112
Id. at *8–9 (describing the events leading to the second DANCO violation).
113
Id. at *9 (noting the criminal offenses Ness was charged with as a result of the
November 23, 2011, incident). The new felony DANCO violation charge was based on Ness’s
violation of DANCO 2. Id. During the arrest, Ness refused to cooperate with police orders and
was ultimately charged with obstruction of legal process. Id.
114
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 222 (stating that Ness filed a motion to dismiss the
DANCO violation charges prior to the court trial scheduled to address them).
115
Trial Court Memorandum, supra note 75, at 8 (discussing Ness’s arguments).
Ness argued that the DANCO statute does not provide adequate notice and opportunity to be
heard and is unconstitutionally vague. Id. A criminal statute violates the void-for-vagueness
doctrine “(1) if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute; or (2) if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.” Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 228. At issue in Ness was the second
type of vagueness, arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Trial Court Memorandum, supra
note 75, at 11.
116
Trial Court Memorandum, supra note 75, at 13 (explaining the district court’s
reasoning). The district court first determined that Ness may challenge the constitutionality of
the DANCO statute in a subsequent proceeding because MINN. STAT. § 629.75 implicates a
protected liberty and may be distinguished from Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes. See
supra notes 80–81 (discussing the ability of a criminal defendant charged with a pretrial
DANCO violation to collaterally attack it in a subsequent criminal proceeding).
117
Trial Court Memorandum, supra note 75, at 9–10 (stressing a defendant’s lack
of advance notice and opportunity to prepare for the DANCO hearing as evidence of the
ineffective process provided for under the DANCO statute). The district court noted that a
defendant may or may not be represented by counsel at the pretrial release hearing or have the
ability or opportunity to review the petition prior to the DANCO hearing. Id. at 9.
Furthermore, MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdivs. 1(b), (c) do not establish a burden of proof for
the DANCO proceeding. Id.
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standards for district courts in issuing a DANCO.118 The district court
determined that the absence of standards or restrictions rendered the statute
unconstitutionally vague.119
The State appealed the district court’s holding to the Minnesota
Court of Appeals.120 The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district
court’s allowance of the collateral attack, but it reversed the district court’s
determination that the DANCO statute is unconstitutional.121 The court found
that while there is the possibility a defendant may be erroneously deprived of
a constitutionally protected right pending trial, that risk is minimal and
justified.122 The court also determined that the DANCO statute provides a
118
Id. at 10–11 (observing that MINN. STAT. § 629.75 fails to provide any
legislative guidance or standards for a district court to apply when determining whether to
issue a DANCO). The DANCO statute defines what a DANCO is and explains in what types
of cases a DANCO may be issued. Id. at 11. The district court compared the DANCO statute
with Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes. Id. at 12. The court noted that both the OFP and
HRO statutes contain extensive procedural requirements and guidance, such as: (1) explicitly
stating who may petition the court for relief; (2) listing what must be alleged in the petition;
(3) providing notice and service requirements; (4) describing under what circumstances a
hearing takes place; (5) stating what relief may be provided by the court; and (6) providing the
procedures for extending, modifying, or vacating an order. Id. The district court stated that the
lack of legislative guidance allowed courts “absolute and unfettered discretion in determining
when to issue a DANCO.” Id. at 13. The district court feared such unfettered judicial
discretion would “create a great danger that the statute will be applied arbitrarily and
inconsistently.” Id. See also MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 14; Thornton,
supra note 67 (noting there has been no uniform application of the DANCO statute by district
courts).
119
Trial Court Memorandum, supra note 75, at 13 (finding the DANCO statute
void-for-vagueness). The district court rejected the State’s argument that a court can judicially
fix procedural defects in a statute to remedy any unconstitutional vagueness. Id. at 9–10. The
State relied on State v. Coleman, 731 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), which held an
enhanced sentencing statute constitutional even though the statute lacked specific procedural
guidance because a court could adequately protect defendants’ rights through “unique
judiciary functions.” Id. at 10. The court distinguished Coleman from Ness, noting that a court
cannot impose limitations on discretion that do not appear on the face of the statute. Id. (citing
State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. 1985) (holding that courts cannot cure a
statute of vagueness by “imposing post facto limitations where no such restraints appear on
the face of the legislation”)).
120
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 221 (noting the procedural posture of the case).
121
Id. at 230 (discussing the Minnesota Court of Appeals’’ holding). The
Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that pretrial DANCOs are not final
court orders and therefore do not provide criminal defendants a clear right to appeal the
issuance of the DANCO. Id. at 224. See supra text accompanying note 80 (distinguishing
pretrial DANCOs from OFPs and HROs). The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not declare the
DANCO statute unconstitutional because criminal defendants are afforded some due process
when courts issue DANCOs pursuant to the DANCO statute. Id. at 226.
122
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 228 (rejecting Ness’s argument that the DANCO statute
violates a defendant’s constitutional rights). See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text
(discussing the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ application of the Mathews balancing test to the
facts of Ness). The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that the state’s significant interest in
protecting the victims of domestic violence and upholding the integrity of the judicial process
justifies any risk of violating a defendant’s right to contact family or household members.
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 226, 228. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that sufficient
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defendant with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.123 The court
noted that while the DANCO statute itself does not contain a notice
provision, adequate notice is provided through notice of the underlying
criminal charge.124 Further, the DANCO statute provides some safeguards
ensuring defendants are not erroneously deprived of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.125 Finally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
determined that, while it is true Minnesota Statute § 629.75 does not
explicitly set forth the factors the district court should consider in deciding
whether to issue a DANCO, the absence of those factors alone is not enough
to invalidate the DANCO statute.126 The court reasoned that a judge’s
discretion in issuing a DANCO is sufficiently limited because there must be

safeguards exist to ensure that defendants are not erroneously deprived of their constitutional
liberties. Id. at 227. Specifically, the court emphasized the requirement that, in order for a
district court to issue a DANCO, it must first find sufficient probable cause exists regarding
the underlying criminal charge. Id.
123
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 225–28 (referring to the concept of procedural due
process as flexible) (citing Sweet v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 702 N.W.2d 314, 320 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2005)). The degree of notice required is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
226 (citing Comm’r of Natural Res. v. Nicollet Cnty. Pub. Water/Wetlands Hearings Unit,
633 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001)).
124
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 226 (determining that the DANCO statute provides
adequate due process in conjunction with other statutory provisions and safeguards). A
DANCO is issued in connection with a criminal proceeding. Id. Defendants are provided
notice of the underlying criminal charge when the defendant is served with a copy of the
complaint. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals maintained that by receiving notice of the
criminal proceeding from which the DANCO is issued, the defendant receives notice of the
DANCO because MINN. STAT. § 629.75 specifies with what charges a DANCO may be issued
in connection. Id.
125
Id. at 227 (noting that due process requires “some form of a hearing” be
provided for by the challenged statute to ensure an individual is not deprived of a protected
interest) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333). The DANCO statute states that a DANCO “shall
be issued in a proceeding that is separate from but held immediately following a proceeding in
which any pretrial release or sentencing issues are decided.” MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv.
1(c). By providing for such a proceeding separate from the underlying criminal pretrial
hearing, a defendant is provided a meaningful opportunity to challenge the validity of the
DANCO. Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 227. Furthermore, a defendant may request the court modify or
lift the DANCO at a subsequent proceeding. Id. at 228. Further, Minnesota case law does not
afford criminal defendants the same degree of procedural safeguards at a pretrial hearing as
they would receive at a trial. Id. at 227 (citing State v. Rud, 359 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn.
1984)). The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that a criminal defendant at a pretrial
proceeding, separate from the pretrial hearing, is entitled to “even fewer adversarial
safeguards.” Id.
126
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 229 (reversing the district court’s holding that the
DANCO statute is impermissibly vague). The Minnesota Court of Appeals had previously
held that a statute is not void for vagueness when the state is required to show the offense was
committed within the definition of the crime charged. Id. at 229 (discussing In re Welfare of
K.C., 513 N.W.2d 18, 21–22 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). The Minnesota Court of Appeals
determined that the DANCO statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it requires the
DANCO be issued following the underlying criminal charge’s hearing, at which the state must
prove probable cause. Id. at 230.
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an underlying, qualified criminal offense before a court can issue a
DANCO.127
C. Reasoning of the Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Ness’s
case.128 The only issue before the court was whether Minnesota Statute
§ 629.75 is facially unconstitutional on due process grounds.129 The court
noted that the challenger bears the burden of proving that the legislation is
unconstitutional in all applications in a facial challenge.130 The court
determined that Ness did not meet his burden in establishing that Minnesota
Statute § 629.75 fails to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard
every time a DANCO is issued.131 As a result, the court found that the
127

Id. at 229 (noting the DANCO statute sufficiently limits a district court judge’s
discretion because it requires a specific type of criminal proceeding already be underway in
order for a DANCO to be issued). The Minnesota Court of Appeals observed that when
setting terms of conditional release, courts are already looking to the factors contained in
Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, subdiv. 2 for guidance in determining whether to issue a DANCO. Id.
These factors include “the facts surrounding the arrest, the weight of the evidence against the
defendant, the defendant’s record of convictions, the seriousness of the offense, the threat
posed by contact with the alleged victim, and the preferences of the alleged victim.” Id. at
229–30. Additionally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that a defendant is not estopped
from challenging the issuance of the DANCO at his initial appearance or at a subsequent
proceeding. Id. at 230.
128
Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 181 (stating the procedural posture of the case).
129
Id. (noting the issues before the court for review). The Minnesota Supreme
Court considered whether on its face the DANCO statute: “(1) always fails to provide
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard or (2) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” Id. The State did not challenge the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ holding that
Ness could collaterally challenge the constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1. Id.
130
Id. at 182 (stating that in a facial challenge the defendant must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid) (citing United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Courts rarely declare laws unconstitutional, exercising
their power to do so “with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” Id. (citing In
re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989)). A facial challenge is the most difficult
challenge to successfully assert, making the challenger’s burden especially difficult to
establish. Id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).
131
Id. at 183 (analyzing the three subparts of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1 and
determining that the statute does provide for adequate notice and opportunity to be heard).
Ness’s facial challenge to the DANCO statute could not overcome its heavy burden because
the court determined due process was afforded in at least one circumstance. Id. The Minnesota
Supreme Court compared Ness to McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 831 N.W.2d 518, 522
(Minn. 2013). Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 183. In McCaughtry, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected a defendant’s facial challenge to a city ordinance because the ordinance, on its face,
provided for judicial discretion in issuing the administrative warrant. McCaughtry, 831
N.W.2d at 524. The court concluded that like the ordinance statute in McCaughtry, MINN.
STAT. § 629.75 provides, on its face, for a subsequent judicial proceeding during which the
district court judge may exercise his or her discretion in determining whether to issue the
DANCO. Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 183. The Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized that it is the
“immediately following” requirement of MINN. STAT. § 629.75 that ensures a defendant
receives “notice of the conditions to be imposed and an opportunity to challenge those
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DANCO statute could not be held to be procedurally inadequate.132 The
Minnesota Supreme Court further determined that Ness failed to establish
that Minnesota Statute § 629.75 is unconstitutionally vague because the
statute does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.133 The
court noted that while the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
laws must provide explicit standards for application to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, broad grants of discretion are common and the
lack of factors alone does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague.134
IV. ANALYSIS
District courts need guidance in determining when and how
DANCOs should be issued.135 Ness establishes troubling precedent for
criminal defendants by essentially eliminating facial challenges to procedural
due process as a viable basis to challenge the constitutionality of Minnesota
conditions in a constitutionally sufficient proceeding immediately before the court imposes a
[DANCO].” Id.
132
Id. at 182 (explaining that if the statute can be constitutionally applied in one
set of facts, it is “inappropriate to speculate regarding other hypothetical circumstances that
might arise”) (citing Minn. Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 694
(Minn. 2009)).
133
Id. at 184–85 (noting that MINN. STAT. § 629.75 does, on its face, limit a
judge’s discretion in issuing DANCOs). The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that, like
the OFP and HRO statutes, the DANCO statute provided for sufficient judicial checks to
ensure constitutionality. Id. For instance, under the terms of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv.
1(a), a judge may only issue a DANCO to a limited class of individuals. Id. at 185.
Additionally, subdiv. 1(b) places restrictions on the form of a DANCO and requires a hearing
be held. Id. Further, subdiv. 1(c) places limitations on when a DANCO may be issued. Id.
These requirements, coupled with Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, act as checks on a court’s authority,
ensuring that DANCOs are limited to cases in which:
(1) the court has made a preliminary finding that there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant has committed one of the enumerated offenses,
(2) the court has considered whether a no contact order is necessary for
the safety of the victim or other persons, and (3) the court has issued a
written order setting forth the conditions of release.
Id.
134
Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 184 (stating that a legislature must establish minimal
guidelines to govern enforcement of its law in order for the law to avoid being struck down on
vagueness grounds) (citing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999)). A vague law
“impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to . . . judges and juries for resolution . . . on a
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Id.
(quoting In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. 1978) (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972))). As a result, laws must provide administrative and
judicial bodies with explicit standards regarding their application to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court notes that broad grants of
power are nevertheless common and are sufficiently limited by judicial discretion. Id. Judicial
discretion is further limited by the principle that “all acts of judicial discretion require
‘conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.’” Id. (quoting State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632,
638 (Minn. 2008)).
135
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the lack of judicial
uniformity in interpreting Minnesota’s DANCO statute).
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Statute § 629.75.136 Minnesota’s DANCO statute itself fails to provide courts
with detailed enough procedural standards and judicial restrictions to render
the statute wholly valid.137 Criminal defendants’ constitutionally-protected
liberties will continue to be restricted and infringed upon without further
legislative guidance.138
A. Some, But Not All, DANCO Proceedings Will Afford Effective
Procedural Due Process
Despite the Minnesota courts’ belief that the DANCO statute
sufficiently protects criminal defendants’ rights, not all criminal defendants
receive sufficient procedural due process prior to the issuance of a
DANCO.139 Criminal defendants’ procedural due process rights are only
upheld when the DANCO is imposed immediately following a pretrial
hearing that provides constitutionally sufficient notice and an opportunity to
be heard.140 The initial hearing for the underlying criminal matter must afford
a criminal defendant the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the
hearing in order to pass constitutional muster.141 In principle, Minnesota’s
DANCO statute is constitutional on its face because a criminal defendant is
theoretically provided notice and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing
regarding the underlying criminal matter.142 Ness essentially forecloses any
opportunity for criminal defendants to successfully bring facial challenges
against Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1.143 Nonetheless, the DANCO
statute can still be challenged on an as-applied basis.144

136

See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s holding in Ness); see also supra note 82 (noting the negative impact of the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ness on subsequent appeals challenging the
constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 629.75 on due process grounds).
137
See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (discussing the void-forvagueness doctrine).
138
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (providing the Minnesota Court
of Appeals’ analysis of the Mathews balancing test).
139
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (providing an example of when a
DANCO may not have been issued in a separate proceeding, thereby potentially violating a
defendant’s right to due process); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the
lack of judicial uniformity in DANCO enforcement).
140
See supra text accompanying notes 130–132 (discussing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s holding that Ness failed to meet his burden in proving that the DANCO
statute is unconstitutional in all applications as required by a facial challenge).
141
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (exploring the statutorily provided
protections in the DANCO statute).
142
See supra notes 129–132 (describing the difficulties parties face in raising a
facial challenge under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis).
143
See supra text accompanying notes 129–132 (providing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s holding in Ness).
144
See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (discussing the facial and asapplied constitutional challenges).
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1. Circumstances Affording Constitutionally Sufficient Procedural Due
Process Are Few and Far Between
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the DANCO
statute as constitutional is the result of a tortured analysis, because the court
did not limit its analysis solely to the DANCO statute.145 Generally, a
defendant rarely succeeds on a facial challenge due to the onerous burden
imposed by the courts, as evidenced by the Ness case. 146 In Ness, the
Minnesota Supreme Court created a theoretical circumstance in which a
defendant’s procedural due process rights are satisfied by focusing on the
rare occasion when a DANCO is issued immediately following a pretrial
hearing.147 In doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court constructed its own
tangential interpretation of the DANCO statute.148 The court’s interpretation
relies too heavily on other judicial rules and statutory provisions to ensure
that constitutionally sufficient due process is provided to a defendant in a
DANCO proceeding.149
To render the statute constitutional, the Minnesota Supreme Court
was required to supplement the language of Minnesota Statute § 629.75 with
other statutory language because the DANCO statute itself does not include a
stand-alone notice provision.150 On its face, the statute provides for a
theoretically separate proceeding to occur “immediately following” the
conclusion of pretrial proceedings for the underlying criminal matter.151
Reconstruction of statutes should not be the primary basis for rejecting a
defendant’s constitutional challenge; courts should judge the constitutionality
of a law on the language stated in that law and not on other related or
implicated laws.152 Still, the Minnesota Supreme Court did loosely construct

145

See supra text accompanying note 97 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme
Court suggested a defendant could still bring an as-applied constitutional challenge to
determine whether that particular defendant received constitutionally sufficient notice of the
DANCO prior to its issuance).
146
See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text (explaining that the facial
challenge is the most difficult challenge to successfully assert).
147
See supra note 129–130 (discussing the Salerno test for facial challenges).
148
See supra note 133 (coupling MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1, with Minn. R.
Crim. P. 6.02 to establish procedural due process).
149
See supra notes 127, 133 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on
the context in which a DANCO is issued in determining whether the DANCO statute affords
notice and an opportunity to be heard).
150
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing the circumstances in
which a DANCO is issued and noting that the Minnesota Court of Appeals maintained that the
defendant received notice of the DANCO by receiving notice of the criminal proceeding).
151
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (stating that the DANCO statute
provides that a DANCO “shall be issued in a proceeding that is separate from but held
immediately following a proceeding in which any pretrial release or sentencing issues are
decided”).
152
See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the DANCO could not be held procedurally invalid because it could be
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a circumstance in which a defendant’s procedural due process rights are not
inappropriately restricted.153 As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
holding that Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1 is facially constitutional
was proper.154
2. The DANCO Statute May Be Successfully Challenged Under the
As-Applied Doctrine
Criminal defendants will not be successful in facially challenging
Minnesota Statute § 629.75 after Ness.155 Nevertheless, defendants should
still challenge its constitutionality by asserting that the statute was
unconstitutionally applied to their particular case.156 Such challenges will
provide courts with the opportunity to establish judicial guidance on when
and how a court should issue a DANCO.157
Ness does not provide controlling precedent for future as-applied
challenges against the DANCO statute, because Ness’s circumstances are not
typical of all DANCO cases.158 Ness received constitutionally sufficient due
process because he was afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge the
charges levied against him.159 Unlike many criminal defendants, Ness
received the assistance of legal counsel throughout the adjudication process
(providing him the opportunity to understand the charges against him) and
was warned of the criminal consequences of violating a DANCO.160
Furthermore, Ness’s procedural due process rights were protected because
the district court properly conducted the hearings related to the underlying
criminal matters and properly issued the DANCOs.161 Specifically, the trial
court issued the DANCOs in relation to, but separate from, the conditions of
constitutionally applied in one set of facts; therefore, it is “inappropriate to speculate
regarding other hypothetical circumstances that might arise”).
153
See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text (describing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s analysis of Ness’s facial challenge to the DANCO statute).
154
See supra text accompanying note 131 (discussing the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s holding that the DANCO statute was facially constitutional).
155
See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text (analyzing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s discussion of the facial constitutionality and void-for-vagueness of the
DANCO statute).
156
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that a defendant may still
bring an as-applied due process constitutional challenge against MINN. STAT. § 629.75).
157
See supra notes 67, 118 (stating the purpose of issuing a DANCO against a
criminal defendant, but noting the lack of judicial uniformity in DANCO enforcement).
158
See supra text accompanying notes 101–113 (providing the facts of Ness).
159
See supra text accompanying notes 101–103; see also supra text
accompanying notes 109–111 (noting that Ness was represented by legal counsel at his
hearings and was given several warnings from the judge overseeing his case).
160
See supra text accompanying notes 101–103, 105 (describing Ness’s legal
counsel’s representation during the hearings).
161
See supra notes 127, 133 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota
Court of Appeals’ and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holdings that there were sufficient
limits on a judge’s discretion in issuing a DANCO).
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release and warned Ness on the record that any violation of the DANCOs
may result in further criminal charges.162 Moreover, Ness’s decision to
exercise additional rights afforded to him under Minnesota law by
successfully petitioning the court to modify his DANCOs further evidences
that Ness received due process of law.163
The facts of Ness, however, are unique and are not representative of
all DANCO adjudications.164 Criminal defendants are often confused, illinformed, and disorientated during the initial pretrial proceedings.165
Although Ness received explicit notice of his DANCOs, most defendants do
not receive such notice prior to the issuance of the DANCO.166 Similarly,
defendants may or may not be represented by legal counsel during their
pretrial hearings.167 As a result, pro se criminal defendants are not afforded
the same opportunities to understand the charges against them or the
consequences for violating a DANCO. 168
Additionally, the timeframe for the DANCO hearing provided for
under the DANCO statute does not afford criminal defendants sufficient time
to respond to the DANCO request.169 Defendants are not afforded
meaningful opportunities to review the orders, subpoena witnesses, or gather
evidence to present in their defense by holding the DANCO proceeding
“immediately after” the underlying criminal matter’s pretrial hearing.170
Lack of explicit notice, legal counsel, and meaningful opportunities
to respond to DANCO requests do not provide constitutionally sufficient
procedural due process.171 As a result, individual defendants subjected to
162

See supra notes 101, 105, 110 and accompanying text (noting the
circumstances in which the DANCOs were issued).
163
See supra text accompanying note 104; see also supra note 125 and
accompanying text (discussing the various instances in which Ness exercised his right to
modify his DANCOs).
164
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting the district court’s finding
that a defendant may or may not be represented by counsel at the pretrial release hearing or
have the ability or opportunity to review the petition prior to the DANCO hearing).
165
See supra text accompanying notes 4–6 (describing the judicial process from a
defendant’s point of view).
166
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (stating that a defendant’s lack of
advance notice and opportunity to prepare for the DANCO hearing could be seen as evidence
of the ineffective process provided for under the DANCO statute).
167
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting not all criminal defendants
are represented by legal counsel during a pretrial hearing).
168
See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (discussing the various
difficulties enumerated by the district court that defendants face in a DANCO hearing).
169
See supra notes 117, 125 and accompanying text (stating that a DANCO “shall
be issued in a proceeding that is separate from but held immediately following a proceeding in
which any pretrial release or sentencing issues are decided” which may not afford the
defendant enough time to prepare for the hearing or seek legal counsel).
170
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting the lack of process afforded
criminal defendants with regard to the DANCO hearing).
171
See supra notes 117, 125 and accompanying text (discussing the various
reasons an “immediate hearing” may not provide adequate constitutional protections for
defendants in DANCO hearings).
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these circumstances should seek redress in an as-applied challenge to the
constitutionality of Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1.172 The reviewing
court would then be able to consider the particular facts of the case rather
than merely relying on statutory language and interpretation.173 As a result,
the court may find the DANCO statute unconstitutional as applied to the
individual defendant and, therefore, excise the DANCO and its violations
from the defendant’s criminal record.174 Holding the DANCO statute
narrowly unconstitutional in certain instances will provide district courts
with persuasive case law that can be looked to in determining the proper
judicial procedure for issuing a DANCO.175
B. The Standard for Determining Vagueness Is Too Strictly Interpreted by
Courts
The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the void-for-vagueness
doctrine too strictly in Ness, because broad grants of judicial power are
impermissibly vague and therefore violate principles of due process.176
Minnesota Statute § 629.75 fails to provide adequate standards and
restrictions on its application because it does not contain explicit provisions
governing how the statute should be interpreted.177 As a result, the DANCO
statute unjustly encroaches upon defendants’ constitutionally protected
liberties.178 Additional safeguards are needed in order to protect criminal
defendants’ liberties from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the
law.179
The Minnesota Supreme Court glossed over the issue of vagueness
in Ness, relying on the statute’s “immediately following” language and

172
See supra text accompanying notes 83–87 (discussing the differences between
facial and as-applied constitutional challenges).
173
See supra text accompanying note 85 (stating that in an as-applied challenge a
defendant must show that a generally constitutional law was unconstitutionally applied to the
defendant).
174
See supra text accompanying note 87 (noting that as-applied challenges only
render the law unconstitutional concerning that particular defendant’s case).
175
See supra text accompanying note 97 (providing that the Minnesota Supreme
Court suggested a defendant may still bring an as-applied constitutional challenge to
determine whether that particular defendant received constitutionally sufficient notice of the
DANCO prior to its issuance).
176
See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (providing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Ness).
177
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the lack of judicial
uniformity in interpreting Minnesota’s DANCO statute).
178
See supra notes 117, 125 and accompanying text (discussing the various
reasons why an “immediate hearing” may not provide adequate constitutional protections for
defendants in DANCO hearings).
179
See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text (providing the district court’s
reasoning for finding that the DANCO statute was unconstitutional).
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supplementing it with additional Minnesota procedural rules.180 In doing so,
the Minnesota Supreme Court merely reiterated the language of the DANCO
statute rather than explaining how the DANCO statute itself affords due
process of law.181 Minnesota Statute § 629.75 must contain explicit standards
independent of other procedures and standards in order to avoid being held
unconstitutionally vague.182
Courts should not be permitted to reconstruct statutes and
superimpose limitations that do not exist on the face of the statute.183 Courts
ought to interpret the statute as it is written when assessing vagueness.184 To
be valid, the DANCO statute itself must include guidelines directing courts
when and how to correctly apply the statute.185
The Minnesota Supreme Court incorrectly held that the DANCO
statute facially limits a judge’s discretion in issuing a DANCO. 186 The
limitations provided in Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1 do not go far
enough to adequately reign in judicial discretion, because those limitations
do not effectively prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.187 The
lack of uniformity among Minnesota’s district courts further evidences the
DANCO statute’s ambiguous language and sweeping grant of unchecked
judicial authority.188 The DANCO statute fails the void-for-vagueness test
because it does not facially provide enough limitations on judicial
discretion.189

180

See supra text accompanying notes 133–134 (describing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Ness).
181
See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s finding that the Legislature commonly gives broad grants of power to administrative
and judicial branches that are sufficiently limited by judicial discretion).
182
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (observing that MINN. STAT.
§ 629.75 fails to provide any legislative guidance or standards for a district court to apply
when determining whether to issue a DANCO).
183
See supra note 134 and accompanying text (providing the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s finding that judicial discretion suffices to provide limitations that may not exist within
the statute).
184
See supra notes 127, 132and accompanying text (noting that the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the DANCO could not be held procedurally invalid because it could
be constitutionally applied in one set of facts; therefore, it is “inappropriate to speculate
regarding other hypothetical circumstances that might arise”).
185
See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (providing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Ness).
186
See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s holding that the void-for-vagueness doctrine did not apply in Ness).
187
See supra notes 117 and accompanying text (noting the absence of legislative
standards and factors within the DANCO statute).
188
See supra notes 14, 118–119 and accompanying text (observing the lack of
uniformity among district courts in interpreting and enforcing Minnesota’s DANCO statute).
189
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that MINN. STAT. § 629.75
fails to provide any legislative guidance or standards for a district court to apply when
determining whether to issue a DANCO).
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C. Without Clear Guidance from the Minnesota Legislature, District
Courts Will Continue to Struggle in Interpreting the DANCO Statute
The absence of legislative standards and limitations within
Minnesota Statute § 629.75 leaves too much room for judicial discretion and
misinterpretation.190 The Minnesota legislature should amend the DANCO
statute to include specific provisions stipulating when and how a court
should issue a DANCO.191 Minnesota courts will continue to inconsistently
apply Minnesota Statute § 629.75 until the statute’s vagueness is properly
addressed.192
The Minnesota legislature should emulate the specificity of its OFP
and HRO statutes when revising the DANCO statute.193 In doing so the
legislature must break down the elements of a DANCO hearing and the
subsequently issued DANCO.194 Additionally, the Minnesota legislature
ought to clarify the “immediately following” language of Minnesota Statute
§ 629.75, subdiv. 1(c) to ensure that all criminal defendants receive the same
procedural due process.195
1. The Minnesota Legislature Ought to Address the DANCO Petition
The Minnesota legislature should require that a petition be filed and
served on the defendant before a DANCO may be issued.196 This
requirement would effectively limit the court’s discretion in issuing
DANCOs when one is not being sought or the facts of the case do not
necessitate the immediate issuance of a DANCO.197 Moreover, the petition
requirement would ensure a defendant receives adequate notice of the
DANCO prior to the DANCO proceeding.198 Explicit notice of the DANCO
190

See supra note 118 and accompanying text (observing the need for additional
checks on judicial discretion in issuing DANCOs).
191
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (comparing the provisions of MINN.
STAT. §§ 518B.01, 609.748 with MINN. STAT. § 629.75).
192
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stressing the lack of uniform
interpretation of the DANCO statute due its vague language).
193
See supra notes 36–65 and accompanying text (outlining the various provisions
of MINN. STAT. §§ 518B.01, 609.748).
194
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (analyzing the three subparts of
INN
.
S
TAT
. § 629.75, subdiv. 1).
M
195
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting MINN. STAT. § 629.75,
subdiv. 1(c)).
196
See supra text accompanying notes 38–40, 58–60 (discussing the procedural
process of obtaining an OFP and an HRO).
197
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (observing the need for additional
checks on judicial discretion in issuing DANCOs).
198
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (highlighting a defendant’s lack of
advance notice and opportunity to prepare for the DANCO hearing as evidence of ineffective
due process under Minnesota’s DANCO statute); see also supra note 74 and accompanying
text (noting that criminal defendants may be convicted for unknowingly violating the DANCO
statute).
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prior to the DANCO proceeding would provide a defendant with
constitutionally sufficient procedural due process.199
Similarly, the Minnesota legislature ought to stipulate who may
request a DANCO and whether a court may issue a DANCO in the absence
of a request from the state or domestic abuse victim.200 This requirement
would encourage uniformity among Minnesota’s district courts in the
issuance and enforcement of DANCOs.201 In addition, it would ensure that
district courts are not disproportionately imposing DANCOs because there
would be an additional check on judicial discretion.202
Further, Minnesota Statute § 629.75 should be revised to include a
provision discussing the contents of the DANCO petition and order.203 Under
this proposal, the petition must: (a) identify the alleged victim; (b) briefly
recite the facts of the case; (c) provide the probable cause supporting the
underlying criminal charges leading to the DANCO; and (d) include a
statement from the victim indicating whether the victim supports issuing a
DANCO.204 A detailed petition encourages defendants to seek legal advice
prior to the DANCO proceeding.205 Additionally, it provides courts with
sufficient information so that judges can conscientiously, rather than
arbitrarily, determine whether or not to issue a DANCO in a particular
matter.206
2. The Minnesota Legislature Must Define the Scope of Relief Available
The Minnesota legislature must specify the scope of relief the
DANCO statute provides.207 Without further legislative restraints, district
courts have too much unfettered discretion allowing them to impermissibly

199
See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (suggesting that separate
notice of the DANCO proceeding would ensure effective due process).
200
See supra notes 38–40, 58–60 and accompanying text (specifying who may
petition for an OFP and HRO).
201
See supra notes 14, 118–119 and accompanying text (observing the lack of
uniformity among district courts in interpreting and enforcing Minnesota’s DANCO statute).
202
See supra note 134 and accompanying text (stating that a statute must contain
minimal guidelines to govern its enforcement in order for the statute to avoid being struck
down on vagueness grounds).
203
See supra text accompanying notes 39–40, 59–60 (listing the petition
requirements for Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes).
204
See supra text accompanying notes 38–40 (discussing the OFP petition
requirements); see also supra text accompanying notes 58–60 (stating the HRO petition
requirements).
205
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that many criminal
defendants are not represented by legal counsel during the DANCO proceeding).
206
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (outlining the district court’s
suggestions for revising MINN. STAT. § 629.75).
207
See supra notes 45–46, 56 and accompanying text (stating the scope of relief
provided by Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes).
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apply the DANCO statute.208 Revising Minnesota Statute § 629.75 to
stipulate the scope of relief permitted under the statute will resolve the voidfor-vagueness issue by effectively minimizing judicial discretion.209
The DANCO statute should clearly state what relief a court may
provide in issuing a DANCO.210 Such relief should include: (a) restraining
the defendant from committing further acts of domestic abuse against the
alleged victim; (b) prohibiting the defendant from engaging the alleged
victim via in person, electronic, or third party contact; and (c) excluding the
defendant from the victim’s dwelling, place of employment, and a reasonable
area surrounding those locations.211 Judicial relief should be limited to
instances where the prosecutor has sufficient probable cause supporting the
underlying criminal matter’s charges and the defendant has been provided a
meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges and DANCO.212 Where
immediate judicial relief is required to protect the alleged victim, the
Minnesota legislature should provide for an ex parte DANCO to be
temporarily issued.213 The ex parte DANCO would expire either at the
DANCO proceeding if issued prior to the DANCO proceeding or at the
defendant’s next scheduled court appearance if issued at the DANCO
proceeding.214 This would allow the victim to receive immediate judicial
protection while ensuring that the defendant is not indefinitely deprived of
his constitutionally protected rights.215
3. The Minnesota Legislature Should Clarify the DANCO Proceeding
The Minnesota legislature ought to clarify the “immediately
following” language of Minnesota Statute § 629.75.216 The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s tortured interpretation of the DANCO statute in Ness
illustrates the danger of giving courts too much creative license in construing
208

See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the district court’s fear that
the lack of legislative guidance in interpreting the DANCO statute will result in further
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of its provisions).
209
See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the void-for-vagueness
test).
210
See supra notes 45–46, 56 and accompanying text (describing the relief granted
by courts in OFP and HRO hearings).
211
See supra notes 45–46, 56 and accompanying text (noting the type of relief a
court may grant in an OFP or HRO proceeding).
212
See supra notes 50, 112 and accompanying text (requiring probable cause be
established before a protective order may be issued).
213
See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (describing the OFP ex parte
order).
214
See supra notes 45, 61 and accompanying text (noting the impermanent nature
of the ex parte OFP and temporary HRO).
215
See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of an ex
parte order).
216
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting the emphasis the Minnesota
Supreme Court placed on the phrase “immediately following”).
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and applying statutory law.217 The Minnesota legislature should explicitly
state when, where, and how the DANCO proceeding should take place.218
The DANCO proceeding must be independent of the underlying
criminal matter’s hearing.219 The Minnesota legislature ought to first clarify
whether “immediately following” means the same day as or within a
reasonable period of time of the underlying criminal matter’s hearing.220 The
DANCO statute should be revised to allow the DANCO proceeding to occur
within fourteen days of the underlying criminal matter’s hearing when both
parties agree to the delay.221 Such a delay would afford the defendant the
opportunity to meet with legal counsel, review the DANCO petition,
summon witnesses, and present evidence in his defense.222 An ex parte
DANCO could be issued to protect the victim and prohibit the defendant
from contacting the victim prior to the DANCO proceeding.223
These revisions to Minnesota Statute § 629.75 will ensure the
independence of the DANCO proceedings from the underlying criminal
matter and redirect courts to focus on the DANCO proceeding itself when
analyzing issues of due process.224
4. The Minnesota Legislature Should Specify the Circumstances
Prompting a DANCO
Finally, the Minnesota legislature ought to specify under what
circumstances a DANCO may be issued, modified, lifted, or terminated.225
The DANCO statute should explicitly address the factors for a court to
consider in determining whether to issue a DANCO.226 These factors should
217

See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text (explaining the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s reasoning in upholding the constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 629.75,
subdiv. 1).
218
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (highlighting the inadequacies of
Minnesota’s DANCO statute).
219
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (emphasizing the independence of
the DANCO proceeding from the underlying criminal matter’s hearing).
220
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the need for additional
legislative guidance in interpreting MINN. STAT. § 629.75).
221
See supra note 46 and accompanying text (stating that an OFP judicial hearing
must occur within fourteen days of the petition being filed with the court).
222
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (stressing a defendant’s lack of
advance notice and opportunity to prepare for the DANCO hearing as evidence of the
ineffective process provided for under the DANCO statute).
223
See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of an OFP
ex parte order).
224
See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the interconnectedness
between the DANCO statute and other statutory provisions).
225
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that Minnesota’s OFP and
HRO statutes have provisions regarding the modification and termination of these civil
protective orders).
226
See supra notes 50, 63 and accompanying text (addressing the factors courts
should consider in determining whether to issue an OFP or HRO).
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include: (a) the facts of the case; (b) the weight of the evidence against the
defendant; (c) the defendant’s criminal record; (d) the seriousness of the
alleged offense; (e) the threat posed by contact with the victim; and (f) the
preferences of the victim.227
Additionally, the DANCO statute should stipulate under what
circumstances a DANCO may be modified.228 The Minnesota legislature
should establish a uniform process for courts to follow when modifying or
lifting the terms of an existing DANCO.229 Further, Minnesota Statute
§ 629.75 ought to be revised to address when a pretrial DANCO expires or
otherwise ceases to exist.230 DANCOs should be valid for a period of two
years or until the final disposition of the underlying criminal matter,
whichever occurs first.231 Uncertainties and inconsistencies among courts
will continue unless the DANCO statute explicitly addresses the procedural
processes surrounding the enforcement of DANCOs.232
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Ness creates troubling
precedent for the future of criminal defendants’ rights in Minnesota DANCO
proceedings.233 Further legislative guidance is needed before Minnesota’s
courts are able to homogenously interpret and apply Minnesota Statute
§ 629.75.234 Until then, Minnesota’s legal professionals must be diligent in
strictly enforcing the DANCO statute’s express language, while also
supporting as-applied constitutional challenges, so as to ensure criminal
defendants are afforded their constitutionally protected due process rights.235

227

See supra note 127 and accompanying text (listing the factors of Minn. R.
Crim. P. 6.02, subdiv. 2).
228
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (stating that a DANCO may be
modified by a subsequent court order).
229
See supra notes 45, 118 and accompanying text (noting that an OFP may be
judicially modified at a later hearing).
230
See supra notes 45, 51 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations
Minnesota’s OFP statute imposes on judicial relief).
231
See supra notes 45, 51 and accompanying text (noting that OFPs are only
effective for two years from the issuance date unless otherwise stipulated by the court).
232
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the detailed procedural
processes included in Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes).
233
See supra notes 82, 97, 136 and accompanying text (noting that Ness has
negative implications on the future of facial constitutional challenges brought against MINN.
STAT. § 629.75 on due process grounds).
234
See supra notes 13–15, 135–138 and accompanying text (discussing the need
for the Minnesota legislature to revise the current DANCO statute).
235
See supra text accompanying notes 183–185 (criticizing the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s interpretation of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1).
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